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IV.

I. INTRODUCTION
In civil procedure courses across the United States, first-year law students often face with unease the complex subject of jurisdiction. Broadly defined as the power of a court to hear and decide cases, jurisdiction functions as
the essential wellspring from which the legitimacy of a court's authority flows.
Indeed, a court's power over a specific person or party plays a key role in understanding jurisdiction generally. And although this principle provides a vital
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protection for the unwary litigant,' the safeguard of personal jurisdiction is often
waived in today's commercially-driven world.2 Enter the forum selection
clause.
A forum selection clause in a contract "designates a particular state or
court as the jurisdiction in which the parties will litigate disputes arising out of
the contract and their contractual relationship.'A Firmly rooted in the principles
of contract law, forum selection clauses serve many functions: they may reduce
uncertainty as to where a potential plaintiff will file suit, 5 constrain otherwise
high litigation-related expenses, 6 and curtail a plaintiffs tactical litigation decisions.7 As the United States Supreme Court noted in its landmark decision on
forum selection clause enforceability, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,8

"[t]he elimination of . .. uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acI
Personal jurisdiction restricts the territorial reach of a court's authority. The minimum contacts analysis of Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny are likewise
well-known by students of civil procedure.
2
See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) (stating that "neither personal jurisdiction nor venue is fundamentally preliminary in the sense that subject matter jurisdiction
is, for both are personal privileges of the defendant, rather than absolute strictures on the court,
and both may be waived by the parties"); see also Ins. Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) (stating that personal jurisdiction, as an individual right, can be
waived by express or implied consent); Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316
(1964) (stating that "parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a
given court").
Some courts and litigators refer to these as "venue selection clauses," but I chose to adopt
the majority usage in designating such provisions "forum selection clauses." Still others call them
"choice-of-forum provisions" or simply "forum clauses." See Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection
Clauses in Internationaland Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 136
n.4 (1982).
4
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2004) (citation omitted).
s
See, e.g., Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. Am. Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200, 205 (W.D. Va.
1982) ("By including [the forum selection clause] in the contract, the two parties eliminated the
uncertainties and great inconveniences that both parties could confront by being forced to adjudicate the contract in a forum [un]familiar to both parties."); see also Julia L. Erickson, Comment,
Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common Law: Steward Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1090, 1092 (1988).
6
See, e.g., Stephen R. Buckingham, Comment, Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.: Judicial
Discretion in Forum Selection, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1379, 1382 n.13 (1989) (stating that prior
agreement on forum for litigation is a cost-control measure); Michael E. Solimine, ForumSelection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure,25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51, 51-52 (1992)
(stating that forum selection clauses "have many virtues," such as the "orderliness and predictability in contractual relationships," and "obviat[e] a potentially costly struggle" over jurisdiction and
venue).
See Gruson, supra note 3, at 133 ("The forum selected by a plaintiff may be very inconve7
nient for the defendant, and the freedom of the plaintiff to select a forum creates uncertainty and
unpredictability for the defendant."); cf Allen R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 783 (1985) ("The choice of forum
has ... become a key strategic battle fought to increase the chances of prevailing on the merits.").
407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
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ceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting." 9
This Note offers a primer on forum selection clause law generally with a
particular focus on the recent West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.10 To begin, Part II surveys the treatment of forum selection clauses by American courts, including the early days in
which such clauses were disfavored. Additionally, Part II traces the recent favorable treatment by the federal courts following Bremen," provides examples
of the varied treatment under state laws, and finally briefly highlights preCaperton West Virginia law. Part III breaks down the Caperton decision by
outlining the requirements to enforce a forum selection clause under current
West Virginia law. Throughout Part III, this Note addresses variables not
present in Caperton that could alter the forum selection clause enforceability
analysis with a particular focus on resisting enforcement. Ultimately, this Note
is intended to serve as a practitioner's guide to forum selection clause enforceability in West Virginia following the Caperton decision.
II. BACKGROUND: A CONSENSUS EMERGES

A.

The Early Days: A HistoricalAversion

Historically, American courts greeted forum selection clauses with nearunanimous disapproval. 12 Based on the well-settled principle that private individuals have "no power to alter the rules of judicial jurisdiction"-commonlyknown as "ousting" a court's jurisdictionI-many courts invalidated clauses
that attempted to exclude the jurisdiction of courts other than those articulated in
the clause. 14 Leading to this judicial suspicion of forum selection clauses was
9
Id. See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) ("[Forum selection
clauses are] an almost indispensable precondition to the achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction."); see generally Erin Ann O'Hara,
The Jurisprudenceand Politics ofForum-Selection Clauses, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 301, 310-12 (2002)
(discussing the costs and benefits of forum selection clauses).
10
690 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 2009).
"

407 U.S. 1.

Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9 ("Forum[]selection clauses have historically not been favored by
American courts."). Nary a court in these early days enforced forum selection clauses. See William E. Syke, Comment, Agreements in Advance Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction on Foreign
Courts, 10 LA. L. REv. 293 (1950).
12

13

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 80 cmt.

a (1971). For a historical discus-

sion of ouster and early forum selection clause jurisprudence, see David H. Taylor, The Forum
Selection Clause:A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 785, 794-99 (1993).
14
See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (stating that "agreements in advance to oust the courts of jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void"); Parker,
Peebles & Knox v. El Saieh, 141 A. 884 (1928); Huntley v. Alejandre, 139 So. 2d 911 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1962); Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Gainesville Iron Works, Inc., 189 S.E.2d 130 (Ga. Ct. App.
1972); Johnson v. Royal Motor Car Ins. Ass'n, 226 Ill. App. Ct. 147 (1922); Nasha River Paper
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the misguided fear that a party employing such a clause was seeking to remove
a court's subject matter jurisdiction by contract, thus effecting a true ouster of
the court's authority.' 5 Explaining this fear, one commentator notes that forum
selection clauses "pose a characterization problem since such clauses may waive
a party's personal jurisdiction objection . . . or offer a reason relevant to forum
non conveniens analysis to favor the contractual forum over other possible forums

,,1

The Bremen Revolution: FederalCourts Lead the Way

B.

Despite this long history of unfavorable treatment, the United States
Supreme Court recognized the "ouster" fears as erroneous and outmoded, and
held that forum selection clauses are prima facie valid absent a showing by the
resisting party that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust under the circumstances, or that the clause is invalid due to other contractual infirmity.17
While it remains true that no private individual has the power to oust a court's
subject matter jurisdiction, the effect of enforcing a forum selection clause is not
so bold. Chief Justice Burger explained in Bremen:
The argument that such clauses are improper because they tend
to "oust" a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial
legal fiction. It appears to rest at core on historical judicial resistance to any attempt to reduce the power and business of a
particular court and has little place in an era when all courts are
overloaded and when businesses once essentially local now operate in world markets. It reflects something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals.' 8
Therefore, under the standard set forth in Bremen, a forum selection
clause may be enforced even when the chosen forum lacks a relationship to the
parties or transaction. The supporting rationale is the court's respect for the
"legitimate expectations of the parties, [as] manifested in their freely negotiated
agreement . . . ."1

Indeed, "[a] freely negotiated private .

.

. agreement, unaf-

Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 111 N.E. 678 (Mass. 1916); Gooseneck Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Barker,
619 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Int'l Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, 212 S.W. 630 (Tex.
1919); Savage v. People's Bldg., Loan & Say. Ass'n, 31 S.E. 991 (W. Va. 1898).
1s
It is axiomatic that "[plarties cannot create subject matter jurisdiction by agreement and thus
cannot waive a subject matter jurisdiction objection." Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata!: Toward a
Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
422, 427 n.29 (1991) [hereinafter Viva Zapata!].
16
Id. at 428 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Lederman traces the possible reasons for the
persistence of this early position. See id. at 428 n.40.
17

Id. at 430; Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.

18

Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.

19

Id.
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fected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power ... should
be given full effect." 20 Regarding the problem of ouster after Bremen, courts no
longer treated a forum selection clause as having effected an ouster; rather,
courts give the clause effect by declining jurisdiction in favor of the agreedupon forum. 2 1 Even though Bremen was decided by the Supreme Court in admiralty, both federal and state courts across the country quickly began to adopt
22
its forum selection clause enforceability analysis in all civil cases.
The Supreme Court expanded the reach of Bremen in Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute.23 In Shute, the high court found that a forum selection clause
located in small print on a cruise line ticket "contract" was valid even though it
was not freely bargained-for between the two parties.2 4 Taking note of the
"realities of form passage contracts"25 and the "special interest" a cruise line has
in "limiting the fora in which it [may be amenable] to suit," the Shute court
found that the resisting party failed to meet the "heavy burden" of showing suf26
ficient inconvenience to set aside the clause as unreasonable under Bremen.
While Shute undoubtedly increased the already heavy burden on a party resisting forum selection clause enforcement, the Court stated that "[i]t bears emphasis that forum[]selection clauses contained in form passage contracts are subject
to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness."27 The seemingly harsh application of Bremen in Shute has engendered substantial criticism, 2 8 and some courts
have scrutinized form passage contracts for fundamental fairness and found
their forum selection clauses invalid. 2 9 Despite the waves made by Ms. Shute's
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315, 317
(4th Cir. 1982) ("If the specification of a particular forum is reasonable, another court should not
consider it an affront to its judicial power, but should respect the provision as the responsible
expression of the parties' intent.").
22
7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 15:15
(4th ed. 1993).
23
499 U.S. 585 (1991).
24
Id. at 593.
25
In the case of a cruise line, a form passage contract is the basic agreement between a traveling tourist and cruise line company. It is most often found as part of the passenger's ticket and
related ticketing documents.
26
Id. at 593-95.
27
Id. at 595. "[W]hile the particular clause [in Shute] was upheld, the Court recognized that
ultimately, the validity of such a clause should depend on the reasonableness of the clause under
the particular circumstances and the 'fundamental fairness' of both the basis for the clause and its
effect." 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
15:15 (4th ed. 1993).
28
See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, ForumSelection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REv. 423, 425 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and ContractualPersonal
Jurisdiction,27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323, 370 (1992).
29
See, e.g., Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd in
part, 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995) (refusing to enforce forum selection clause contained in ticket for
20
21
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cruise to the high court, the basic Bremen rubric and presumption of enforceability has remained substantially unchanged.
C.

State Courts

Most state courts responded to Bremen and its progeny by discarding
their previously-held positions of invalidity by ouster 3 0 and have adopted the
federal presumption of enforceability.3 1 For the states that have directly addressed the issue of forum selection clause enforceability, 32 the enforceability
requirements may be framed somewhat differently; however, most have adopted
by judicial decision the basic rubric first set down in Bremen.33 Still others,
such as Nebraska, have adopted the Model Uniform Choice of Forum Act,
which essentially codifies the Bremen framework in statute.3 4 In a separate
vein, some states have statutorily-specified limitations on the general presumption of enforceability. For instance, the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act recognizes forum selection clauses in franchise agreements as presumptively
In sum, however, only a few states still look upon forum selection
invalid.
clauses with disfavor, although the law in these few states is in flux. 36
passage on a Greek-owned ship designating Greece as the forum where plaintiff was a Florida
citizen who dealt only with a New York corporation and was injured during South American
cruise; because plaintiff would suffer great difficulty in litigating such a claim in Greece, effect of
enforcement was to deprive her of her day in court, and thus requiring her to do so would be fundamentally unfair).
30
See supra Part II.A.
31
See Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of ContractualProvisionLimiting Place or
Court in Which Action May be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404 §§ 2, 4.5, 4.7 (1984); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971); see generally Walter W. Heiser, Forum
Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise,
45 FLA. L. REv. 361, 366-72 (1993).
32
For example, West Virginia had not directly addressed the issue until Caperton even though
the Supreme Court of Appeals had, in dicta, acknowledged a presumption of enforceability for the
first time in General Elec. Co. v. Keyser, 275 S.E.2d 289, 292 n.2 (W. Va. 1981); see infra, Part
II.D.
3
See, e.g., Titan Indem. Co. v. Hood, 895 So. 2d 138, 146-47 (Miss. 2004); see generally
Dougherty, supra note 31 at § 4[a] (Supp.).
34
See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-415 (1969).
35
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7.3(a)(2), (b) (West 2010); see also Kubis & Perszyk Assocs.
v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618 (N.J. 1996).
36
For example, some South Carolina courts have found a strong public policy against the
enforcement of outgoing forum selection clauses (outgoing clauses refer to those provisions that
operate to force a litigant to leave the state court jurisdiction in order to bring suit). See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Key Equip. Fin., 627 S.E.2d 740, 741-42 (S.C. 2006). See also Ins. Prod. Mktg., Inc.
v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549-50 (D.S.C. 2001) (holding that under S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-7-120, "the legislature of South Carolina did not agree with the federal courts'
favorable view of forum selection clauses and desired to insulate South Carolina litigants from
their effect"). For a discussion of the general disfavor in South Carolina, see Consolidated Insured Benefits, Inc. v. Conseco Medical Ins. Co., 370 F. Supp. 2d 397, 401 (D.S.C. 2004). Contra
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Pre-CapertonWest Virginia Law

Prior to Caperton, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had not
directly addressed the substantive issues raised by forum selection clause enforceability,37 in contrast to most states. 38 In 1981, the Supreme Court of Appeals
noted for the first time, in dicta, that forum selection clauses were presumptively
valid:
Unquestionably, forum selection clauses are not contrary to
public policy in and of themselves for they are sanctioned in
commercial sales agreements under W. VA. CODE § 46-1 105(2). Although an early case in our jurisprudence held void a
clause in a stock certificate requiring that shareholders bring
suit in New York, later cases have sanctioned, at least implicitly, forum selection clauses .

. .

. As the Federal court observed,

West Virginia appears not to subscribe to the rule that choice of
forum clauses are void per se. "Rather, the rule of most jurisdictions and the rule that this Court believes that West Virginia
should and would adopt is that such clauses will be enforced
only when found to be reasonable and just."39
III.

FORUM SELECTION ENFORCEABILITY IN WEST VIRGINIA: CAPERTON V.

A.T. MASSEY COAL CO.

A.

The Case That Became a Saga

It might be an understatement to describe the legal narrative of coal operator Hugh M. Caperton as one of the most heavily-litigated matters to have
come before both the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court.40 Without question, the case is now seared into popular
Atl. Floor Servs., Inc., v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878-79 (D.S.C. 2004) (explicitly declining to follow Indianapolis Life). For a discussion of favorable treatment by South
Carolina courts, see id. at 879-80. Only recently has Alabama adopted the majority position as to
the enforceability of outgoing forum selection clauses. See Prof'1 Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700
So. 2d 347 (Ala. 1997) (expressly overruling Redwing Carriers,Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554
(Ala. 1980) and its progeny).
3
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 335 (W. Va. 2009) ("This case presents
the first opportunity for this Court to address substantive issues involving forum[]selection clauses.").
38

See supra note 31.

3
Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 335 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Keyser, 275 S.E.2d 289, 292 n.2
(W. Va. 1981)) (internal citations omitted).
40
Writing for the Court in Caperton,Acting Chief Justice Robin J. Davis recounts the somewhat convoluted procedural history of the case in Part II of the Opinion of the Court. Id. at 33133. The case was argued three separate times, and three written opinions were issued. One opinion was vacated by the court after two justices voluntarily disqualified themselves while another

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

102

[Vol. 113

legal history not for its groundbreaking forum selection jurisprudence, but, rather, for the constitutionally-mandated judicial recusal standard, as created by
the United States Supreme Court. 4 1 To be clear, the United States Supreme
Court did not address the substantive issues of the decision below-namely,
forum selection enforceability and res judicata-but only the constitutional issue
of judicial recusal.42
BriefFactualBackground

B.

As is often the case between sophisticated commercial parties, the disHugh M. Caperton (Mr. Caperton), Harman Development Corpobetween
pute
ration and its subsidiaries (Harman Development), and A.T. Massey Coal Company and its subsidiaries (Massey) arose out of a complex business relationship
rooted in a contract-in this case, a coal supply agreement.43
In 1993, the plaintiff, Mr. Caperton, formed Harman Development,
which later that same year purchased three subsidiaries: Harman Mining Corporation (Harman Mining), Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc. (Sovereign), and Southern
Kentucky Energy Company (Southern).44 Harman Development, Harman Mining, and Sovereign (the Harman Companies) were also plaintiffs in this action.45
Through the acquisition of these three subsidiaries, Harman Development became the owner of Harman Mine, an underground mine located in Buchanan
County, Virginia, which produced high-quality metallurgical coal.46
Based upon a coal supply agreement signed only a year earlier (1992
CSA), Wellmore Coal Corporation (Wellmore) agreed to purchase approximately 750,000 tons of coal per year for a period of ten years from Sovereign and
Southern, then-owners of Harman Mine.47 From the point where the Harman
Companies took ownership of the Harman Mine until 1997, all Harman Mine

was vacated by the United States Supreme Court. Id.; see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). Upon its third rehearing, the case was ultimately decided by an
entirely new court save the author of each opinion, Acting Chief Justice Robin Davis. Caperton,
690 S.E.2d at 333. Massey prevailed on each hearing before the West Virginia high court. Id.
41
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Issue a Rule of Recusal In Cases of Judges' Big Donors,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, at Al.; Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Issues Landmark Ruling on Judicial Recusal, THE NAT'L L.J., June 8, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/
jsp/article.jsp?id=1202431300835.
42
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., _ U.S._, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (holding in a 5-4 decision
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause mandates judicial recusal in cases where
there is a serious risk of actual bias). The majority opinion provoked two strident dissents from
Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia. See id. at 2267-76.
43
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 329 (W. Va. 2009).
4

Id. at 328-29.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 328.

47

Id.
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coal was purchased by Wellmore under the 1992 CSA.48 A new coal supply
agreement (1997 CSA) with a higher price per ton was agreed to between Sovereign, Harman Mining, and Wellmore, commencing January 1, 1997.49 Notably,
the 1997 CSA included a force majeure clauseo and a forum selection clause,
the latter of which stated that "[a]ll actions brought in connection with this
Agreement shall be filed in and decided by the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Virginia." 5'
During the period of the 1992 CSA and at the time the 1997 CSA was
executed, Wellmore sold nearly two-thirds of the coal it purchased from the
Harman Companies to LTV Steel's (LTV) coke plant in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.52 However, on July 19, 1997, LTV announced that it would shutter its
Pittsburgh coke plant due to a change in federal emissions standards.5 3 Meanwhile, Massey had been attempting to sell its West Virginia-mined coal to LTV
with no success. 5 4 Massey acquired LTV's supplier, Wellmore, on July 31,
1997. Thereafter, Massey's conduct, including an attempt to substitute its own
coal for Harman Mine coal that Wellmore had been supplying to the steelmaker,
led LTV to discontinue its purchase of coal from Wellmore.ss On August 5,
1997, Wellmore notified the Harman Companies that if LTV did close its coke
plant, Wellmore expected a pro rata reduction in tonnage of coal under the force
majeure clause of the 1997 CSA.5 6
Following these events, Massey negotiated the purchase of the Harman
Mine from the Harman Companies, and plaintiffs alleged that during that time,
defendant Massey became aware of certain confidential business information
that it later used to destroy the Harman Companies.
On December 1, 1997,
Wellmore declared force majeure based on LTV's plant closure, and notified
the Harman Companies that it would purchase only 205,707 tons of the 573,000
minimum tons of coal required under the 1997 CSA.58 According to the Harman Companies' allegations, Massey thereafter continued to undermine the

48

Id. at 329.

Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 329.
A force majeure clause is "a contractual provision allocating the risk if performance becomes impossible or impractical, esp[ecially] as a result of an event or effect that the parties could
not have anticipated or controlled." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (8th ed. 2004).
5'
The 1992 CSA contained an identical forum selection clause. See Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at
329 n.9.
52
Id. at 329-30.
49
50

s3
54

Id. at 330.

ss

Id.

56

Id.

5
58

Caperton,690 S.E.2d at 330.
Id.

Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAWREVIEW

104

[Vol. 113

financial integrity of the Harman Companies and Mr. Caperton until the Harman
Companies were shortly thereafter forced into bankruptcy. 59
In May 1998, Harman Mining and Sovereign brought several causes of
action relating to Wellmore's declaration offorce majeure against Wellmore in
the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Virginia. 60 On the plaintiffs' contract
claim, the jury returned a verdict for Harman Mining and Sovereign and
awarded six million dollars in damages. 6 1 However, in October 1998, Harman
Development, Harman Mining, Sovereign, and Mr. Caperton filed the action at
issue in the Circuit Court of Boone County, West Virginia, against A.T. Massey
Coal Co. and five of its subsidiaries. 62 Three theories of liability-tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment-were
presented to the jury, but not before the defendants moved for a dismissal based
on the forum selection clause found in the 1997 CSA, which named Buchanan
County, Virginia, as the exclusive forum for litigation. 6 3 The motion was denied, and the action proceeded to verdict. The plaintiffs were awarded over fifty
million dollars in punitive damages. 64 Three separate hearings and three written
opinions later, including a remand from the United States Supreme Court, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals finally addressed the issue of forum
selection clause enforcement as appealed by the Massey defendants.s
C.

Initial Procedureand StandardofReview

Because the rules of civil procedure-state and federal-were not
created with forum selection clause enforceability in mind, litigators have turned
to the varied and conventional rules of dismissal or transfer when attempting to
enforce forum selection clauses.6 6 In federal court, parties have attempted to
enforce forum selection clauses under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 67 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a) 68 the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens,69 and under an
The particular instances of conduct alleged by the Harman Companies are outlined in the
Opinion of the Court. See id. at 331.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
59

63

Id. at 332.

Id.
Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 332.
66
Viva Zapata!, supra note 15, at 433.
67
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). See also Viva Zapata!, supra note 15, at 435-40 (describing the transfer
mechanism of § 1404(a) in relation to forum selection clause enforcement).
68
"The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or
district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2006). See also Viva Zapata!,
6

65

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss1/9

10

Ritchie: A Tie that Binds: Forum Selection Clause Enforceability in West V

2010]

A TIE THAT BINDS

105

assortment of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of
subject matter jurisdiction),70 Rule 12(b)(2) (lack of personal jurisdiction),7
Rule 12(b)(3) (improper venue),72 Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted), and Rule 56 (summary judgment).74 One commentator has called for the creation of a "Zapata motion," which would be a
unique motion created specifically for forum selection clause enforcement in
federal court.7 5 While several federal circuit courts have considered such motions under specific Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 12(b)(1),
(3), or (6),76 the Fourth Circuit has adopted the position that a motion to dismiss
based on a forum selection clause should be treated as a motion to dismiss for
improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3). 7 7
supra note 15, at 440-43 (describing the dismissal and transfer mechanism of § 1406(a) in relation
to forum selection clause enforcement).
69
This well-known doctrine provides that
where [a] plaintiff has a choice of forum, a court may, in the exercise of sound
discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction over an action if it determines
that the case may more conveniently, yet justly, proceed in another court before which the plaintiff may bring it after refusal of the exercise of jurisdiction
by the court in which the action was first brought.
20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 115 (2010) (internal footnote omitted); see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). See, e.g., Viva Zapata!,supra note 15, at 443-45 (describing the common law dismissal doctrine in relation to forum selection clause enforcement); Royal Bed &
Spring Co. v. Famossul Indus., 906 F.2d 45, 52-53 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming district court's dismissal rooted in doctrine offorum non conveniens to enforce forum selection clause).
70
See, e.g., Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1196 (4th Cir. 1985).
71
See, e.g., Richardson Greenshields Sec. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
72
See, e.g., Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1982).
7
See, e.g., Instrumentation Ass'n v. Madsen Elec., 859 F.2d 4, 6 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988).
74
See, e.g., Gen. Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986).
See generally Mercury West A.G., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 2004 WL 421793 at *2
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Motions to enforce forum selection clauses have been brought pursuant to each
of Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6) and § 1406(a). Each provides a logical basis for supporting
such a motion, but none provide a perfect fit for a party seeking to enforce a forum selection
clause.").
7
Viva Zapata!,supra note 15, at 433.
76
See, e.g., Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding a
motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); Lipcon
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding such a motion
should be analyzed under Rule 12(b)(3)); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740
F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming forum selection clause dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)). See
generally New Moon Shipping Co. v. Man B & W Diesel, AG, 121 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1997)
(describing the lack of consensus among the circuits as to the proper procedural mechanism for
seeking dismissal based on a forum selection clause).
n
See Sucampo Pharm., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 548-50 (4th Cir. 2006)
(treating a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause as a motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) would result in a more efficient disposition of the case, as the forum selection clause issue would have to be raised in the initial responsive pleading).
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Similarly, West Virginia "[c]ourts generally consider a motion to dismiss, based upon a forum selection clause, as a motion to dismiss for improper
venue."78 On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reviews a
trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss for improper venue for abuse of
discretion.7 9 More importantly, however, a newly-created syllabus point holds
that "review of the applicability and enforceability of a forum[]selection clause
is de novo."80 By announcing a de novo standard of review for forum selection
clause applicability and enforceability, the high court cleared away any remaining doubt about the deference given to the lower court in this area of the law.
As the Court ultimately held in Caperton,8 1 a lower court's denial of a motion to
dismiss based on a misapplication of a forum selection clause will most likely
always constitute an abuse of discretion by the lower court.
D.

The CapertonEnforceabilityRubric: A Four-PartAnalysis

Finding "no impediment to the enforcement of forum[]selection clauses
in general" under West Virginia law, 82 the Caperton court adopted a four-part
test from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit83 "for determining whether a claim should be dismissed based upon a forum[]selection
clause." Syllabus point four describes the test:
The first inquiry is [1] whether the clause was reasonably communicated to the party resisting enforcement. The second step
requires [2] classification of the clause as mandatory or permissive, i.e., whether the parties are requiredto bring any dispute
to the designated forum or are simply permitted to do so. The
third query asks [3] whether the claims and parties involved in
the suit are subject to the forum[]selection clause. If the forum[]selection clause was communicated to the resisting party,
has mandatory force and covers the claims and parties involved
78

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 333 (W. Va. 2009) (quoting FRANKLIN

D. CLECKLEY, ROBIN J. DAVIS & Louis J. PALMER, JR., LITIGATION HANDBOOK ON WEST VIRGINIA
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 376 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter LITIGATION HANDBOOK]). See general-

ly W. VA. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
7
Syl. pt. 1, Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 327 (quoting Syl. pt. 1,United Bank, Inc. v. Blosser, 624
S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 2005)).
80
Syl. pt. 2, Caperton, 690 S.E.2d 327 (quoting Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 999 F.2d 206, 207
(7th Cir. 1993)); see also Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 956 (10th
Cir. 1992). The Caperton court also noted support from Syllabus point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 459 S.E.2d 415 (W. Va. 1995) ("Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is
clearly a question of law or involving the interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard
of review.").
81
Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 349.
82
Id. at 336; see supra Part II.D.
83
Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007).
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in the dispute, it is presumptively enforceable. The fourth, and
final, step is to ascertain [4] whether the resisting party has rebutted the presumption of enforceability by making a sufficiently strong showing that enforcement would be unreasonable and
unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud
or overreaching. 84
1.

Was the Clause Reasonably Communicated to the Party Resisting Enforcement?

The inquiry as to whether the forum selection clause was reasonably
communicated is an essential preliminary question because "the legal effect of a
forum[]selection clause depends in the first instance upon whether its existence
was reasonably communicated to the plaintiff....
Early on, the eminent Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals defined this test in terms of whether the drafting party had "done all
it reasonably could to warn the [other party] that the terms and conditions were
important matters of contract affecting his legal rights."86 In yet another form
passage contract dispute, the First Circuit employed a two-part test, which involves "an analysis of the overall circumstances on a case-by-case basis, with an
examination not only of the ticket itself, but also of any extrinsic factors indicating the passenger's ability to become meaningfully informed of the contractual
terms at stake." 87 This two-part test of reasonable communication has been
adopted by most federal circuit courts and some state high courts.8 8 The Third
Sy l . pt. 4, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 327 (W. Va. 2009) (emphasis
in original).
85
Id. at 327 (quoting Electroplated Metal Solutions, Inc. v. Am. Servs., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d
974, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2007)). "A forum selection clause is unenforceable as to a plaintiff who did not
have sufficient notice of the forum selection clause prior to entering the contract." Id. (quoting
17A C.J.S. Contracts § 237, at 211 (1999)).
86
Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 388 F.2d 11, 17 (2d Cir. 1968).
87
Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 866 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Lousararian
v. Royal Caribbean Corp., 951 F.2d 7, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1991). Applications of this test vary. See,
e.g., Gomez v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, 964 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D.P.R. 1997) (terms and conditions of ticket contract reasonably communicated are enforceable whether or not the passenger
actually read them); Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1987) (notice of the
terms and conditions contained in a form passage contract can be imputed to a passenger who has
not personally received the ticket); cf Hoekstra v. Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 360 F. Supp. 2d 362
(D.P.R. 2005) (declining to enforce a forum selection clause where passengers could not have had
prior knowledge of the clause given that they did not receive any documentation before arriving at
the pier).
88
See, e.g., Krenkel v. Kerzner Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 579 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) ("A
useful two-part test of 'reasonable communicativeness' takes into account the clause's physical
characteristics and whether the plaintiffs had the ability to become meaningfully informed of the
clause and to reject its terms."); see also Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 835-37
(9th Cir. 2002); Ward v. Cross Sound Ferry, 273 F.3d 520, 523-24 (2d Cir. 2001); Dillon v. Admiral Cruises, Inc., 960 F.2d 743, 744-45 (8th Cir. 1992); Shankles, 722 F.2d at 866. For state
84
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Circuit recently characterized this test as a "liberal examination of the provision
for clarity, physical placement, and ease of understanding." 8 9 While the form
passage contract cases brought by passengers challenging forum selection clauses provide instructive examples of the "reasonably communicated" requirement, 90 similarly-grounded forum selection challenges between sophisticated
individuals or businesses elicit less sympathy from the courts. 91
The first prong was not disputed in Caperton.92 The Court made clear
that even had the plaintiffs denied that the clause was reasonably communicated
to them, two plaintiffs, Sovereign and Harman Mining, were parties to the actual
1997 CSA contract wherein the forum selection clause was contained, and Mr.
Caperton had signed the contract in his capacity as president of Sovereign.93
Thus, "these parties [could not] claim ignorance of the plainly[-]worded forum[]selection clause . . . ."94 And even though Harman Development, the parent company of Sovereign and Harman Mining, was not a party to the 1997
CSA, Mr. Caperton was the sole owner of Harman Development. The Court
found that because Mr. Caperton had knowledge of the clause by virtue of his
signature as president of Sovereign, Harman Development was "deemed to have
knowledge of the clause." 95
The lesson to be drawn from this particular requirement is fairly clear.
It is axiomatic that in the absence of contractual infirmity such as fraud or mistake,96 parties to a contract are deemed to have knowledge of its contents, and

application of this two-part test, see Oltman v. HollandAm. Line USA, Inc., 178 P.3d 981, 991-93
(Wash. 2008).
89
Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 2002); see Marek, 817 F.2d at
245 (focusing on the "adequacy of so-called 'warning language,' often found on the front cover of
a cruise ticket, directing a passenger to read the particular terms inside the ticket," as well as "the
ticket terms themselves," including the "physical characteristics [such] as the location of the terms
within the ticket, the size of the typeface in which they are printed, and the simplicity of the language they employ").
90
Even in cases where passengers challenge the forum selection clause found on their ticket as
not having been reasonably communicated, courts are loath to invalidate the agreement. See, e.g.,
Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7, 9 (2d. Cir. 1995) (explaining that despite being in fine
print, a forum selection clause stated in clear and unambiguous language is considered reasonably
communicated to the plaintiff in determining its enforceability and thus does not violate notions of
fundamental fairness).
91 See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
92
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 337 (W. Va. 2009).

93

Id.

Id. See Klotz v. Xerox Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 337. See Clark v. Milam, 452 S.E.2d 714, 718 (W. Va. 1994)
("Generally, a corporation 'knows,' or 'discovers,' what its offers and directors know.").
96
An attack on a forum selection clause due to a contractual infirmity is discussed, infra, Part
III.D.4.
94
9s
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those contents may contain a forum selection clause.97 Reasonable prudence on
the part of the drafting party to ensure this requirement is fulfilled will only
strengthen its defense should the validity of the forum selection clause be attacked. A party resisting enforcement on this element may claim the subject
clause was hidden, written in fine print, or somehow buried in the text of the
agreement, although courts are rarely persuaded by such arguments,98 especially
when proffered by sophisticated parties. 99
2.

Is the Clause Mandatory or Permissive?

The second step of the enforceability analysis asks whether the forum
selection clause at issue is mandatory or permissive in its operative effect.100
Syllabus point five provides: "There are two types of forum[]selection clauses:
mandatory and permissive. A mandatory forum[]selection clause contains clear
language indicating that jurisdiction is appropriate only in a designated forum.
A permissive forum[]selection clause authorizes litigation in a designated forum, but does not prohibit litigation elsewhere."101 Syllabus point six elaborates
on the dichotomy:
The determination of whether a forum[]selection clause is mandatory or permissive requires an examination of the particular
language contained therein. If jurisdiction is specified with
mandatory terms such as "shall," or exclusive terms such as
See infra note 207 and accompanying text. See, e.g., D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462
F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding forum selection clause was reasonably communicated to
investor-plaintiffs because the clause was "plainly printed on the Cash Account Agreements").
98
See, e.g., Sheldon v. Hart, No. 5:09CV51, 2010 WL 114007, at *3 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 8,
2010) (rejecting a challenge to a forum selection clause as not reasonably communicated where
even though the drafting party "allegedly 'shoved th[e] document under Ms. Sheldon's nose,"' the
drafting party did not "attempt to hide" the clause); Heinz v. Grand Circle Travel, 329 F. Supp. 2d
896, 902-03 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (where forum selection clause notice was placed in all capitals and
was in easily readable font, such characteristics were sufficient to give passenger reasonable notice of clause).
9
See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
100
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 337 (W. Va. 2009).
101 Syl. pt. 5, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 327 (W. Va. 2009) (quoting
LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 78, at 376). See also Weisser v. PNC Bank, N.A., 967 So. 2d
327, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ("'Permissive forum selection clauses constitute nothing more
than a consent to jurisdiction and venue in the named forum and do not exclude jurisdiction or
venue in any other forum.' . . . In contrast, mandatory forum selection clauses provide 'for a mandatory and exclusive place for future litigation."' (citations omitted)); Great N. Ins. Co. v. Constab
Polymer-Chemie GmbH & Co., No. 5:01-CV-0882, 2007 WL 2891981, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
2007) ("A mandatory forum selection clause grants exclusive jurisdiction to a selected forum and
should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside . . . . In contrast, a 'permissive
forum selection clause indicates the contracting parties' consent to resolve their dispute in a given
forum, but does not require the dispute to be resolved in that forum . . . .' (internal citations omitted)).
9
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"sole," "only," or "exclusive," the clause will be enforced as a
mandatory forum[]selection clause. However, if jurisdiction is
not modified by mandatory or exclusive language, the clause
will be deemed permissive only.1 02
The clause language in Caperton clearly employed mandatory language.
The provision stated that "[a]ll actions brought in connection with this Agreement shall be filed in and decided by the Circuit Court of Buchanan County,
Virginia."' 03 Notwithstanding the ease with which the clause within the 1997
CSA was found to be mandatory, the Court discussed a handful of example cases to illustrate how the differences in language employed can lead to a forum
selection clause being classified as either mandatory or permissive. 104
For instance, a forum selection clause in dispute in a Florida state court
read that "[a]ny litigation concerning this contract shall be governed by the law
of the State of Florida, with proper venue in Palm Beach County." 05 While the
Florida court found that the choice of law clause was mandatory in effect, the
forum selection was permissive because the clause "lack[ed] mandatory language or words of exclusivity to show that venue [was] proper only in Palm
Beach County.

. .

. The language merely allow[ed] a party to file suit in Palm

Beach County." 06 From this, the Caperton court observed that it is not enough
for a forum selection clause to "simply mention or list" a jurisdiction.' 7 Rather,
mandatory language or any other language indicating the parties' intent to make
jurisdiction exclusive is necessary.1
Syl. pt. 6, Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 327.
103
Id. at 329 (emphasis in original). See also Ex parte Bad Toys Holdings, Inc., 958 So. 2d
852, 856 (Ala. 2006) ("The forum[]selection clause in the purchase agreement provides that
'[v]enue for any legal action which may be brought hereunder shall be deemed to lie in Sullivan
County, Tennessee' (emphasis added). The . . . use of the word 'shall' in the forum[]selection
clause makes the clause mandatory, not permissive."); Town of Homer v. United Healthcare of
La., Inc., 948 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (La. Ct. App. 2007) ("We find the forum selection clause at issue
to be clear and explicit. The clause expressly states that the proper venue for any legal action
shall be East Baton Rouge Parish. There is no ambiguity in this mandatory provision.") (emphasis in original); Gen. Elec. Co. v. G. Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., 29 F.3d 1095, 1099 (6th Cir.
1994) ("Because the clause states that 'all' disputes 'shall' be at Siempelkamp's principal place of
business, it selects German court jurisdiction exclusively and is mandatory.").
'
Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 338-39; see generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Permissive
or MandatoryNature ofForum Selection Clauses under State Law, 32 A.L.R. 6th 419 (2008).
105
Regal Kitchens, Inc. v. O'Connor & Taylor Condo. Constr., Inc., 894 So. 2d 288, 290 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
106
Id. at 291-92 (emphasis added).
107
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 338 (W. Va. 2009).
108
Id. See also John Boutari & Sons, Wine & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Imp. & Distribs., Inc., 22
F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The general rule in cases containing forum selection clauses is that
'[w]hen only jurisdiction is specified the clause will generally not be enforced without some further language indicating the parties' intent to make jurisdiction exclusive."' (quoting Docksider,
Ltd. v. Sea Technology, Ltd., 875 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1989))).
102
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In Golf Scoring Systems Unlimited, Inc. v. Remedio, a Florida appellate
decision, the court found that even though a forum selection clause did not contain any words of exclusivity, it was mandatory rather than permissive because
of other limiting language. 109 The clause read: "The parties hereto consent to
Broward County, Florida, as the proper venue for all actions that may be
brought pursuant hereto." 0 The Remedio court observed that while the clause
did not contain the "magic words" of exclusivity, such as "shall" or "must," 11
the language "clearly indicate[ed] that it [was] mandatory in nature." 1 2 The
reasoning here was that the word "the" before the phrase "proper venue" restricted venue to only Broward County "to the exclusion of all others."" 3
Likewise, in a more recent Florida' 1 4 appellate decision, Celistics, LLC
v. Gonzales, the court held a forum selection clause mandatory after examining
the nature of the language rather than simply relying on the presence or absence
of "magic words."' 15 The clause read: "[T]he parties agree to select the venue
and jurisdiction of the Courts and Tribunals of the city of Madrid."ll 6 The court
reasoned that because the words "agree" and "select" connote exclusivity, the
clause was mandatory.1'
An Ohio appellate court came to a similar conclusion in Bohl v.
Hauke."8 The forum selection clause at issue provided that "jurisdiction and
venue is fixed in Harris County, Texas."' 19 Noting that to be mandatory, a forum selection clause "must clearly display the intent of the contracting parties to
choose a particular forum to the exclusion of all others," the court held that
"fixed" is a "word of exclusivity," and therefore the clause was mandatory.12 0
In some cases, permissive language is employed in the forum selection
clause, but one party may have contracted to give the other party discretion to
choose a particular forum to the exclusion of all others. In Ramsay v. Texas
Trading Co.,121 the party resisting enforcement, an investor, claimed that the
109

877 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).

110

Id. at 828.

"
See, e.g., Mueller v. Sample, 93 P.3d 769, 773 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (holding mandatory a
clause that stated that "any causes of action or suits related to this agreement must be filed" in a
particular judicial district).
112
Remedio, 877 So. 2d at 829.
113

Id.
I chose cases from Florida state courts because the Caperton court cited several Florida
decisions as persuasive authority.
115
22 So. 3d 824, 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
116
Id.
114

117

Id.

118

906 N.E. 2d 450 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).

119

Id. at 453.

120

Id. at 456.
254 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. App. 2008).

121
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forum selection clause was invalid because not only did the clause fail to provide for exclusive jurisdiction in a particular court, but the clause also purported
to vest discretion in the investment company defendant as to which forum plaintiff's case would have to proceed. 122 Essentially, the plaintiff claimed that because the clause was not mandatory as to both parties under all circumstances, it
was unenforceable. 12 3 The clause stated that "[a]ll actions or proceedings ...
shall be governed by the law of Illinois and may, at the discretion and election
of [the investment company], be litigated in a court . .. within Illinois."l 24 Finding that "the parties' bargained-for agreement merits judicial respect," the court
held as enforceable clauses that give one party the discretion to choose the forum.12 5 Once the party has made its choice, the forum is mandatory; otherwise,
the words granting discretion would be meaningless. 126
Beyond the permissive or mandatory dichotomy, some courts have recognized a so-called "hybrid" forum selection clause. One such version of this
hybrid forum selection clause "provides for permissive jurisdiction in one forum
that becomes mandatory upon the party sued."1 2 7 For example, an Eleventh
Circuit decision enforced such a clause where the first part of the provision
merely permitted jurisdiction in Orange County, Florida, "but if a suit is initiated there, the defendant's consent to venue in Orange County is contractually
provided."l 2 8 The second part waived the parties' rights to transfer the suit to
"any other court" once the suit was filed, making the chosen forum effectively
mandatory to both parties.12 9
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit found a forum selection clause permissive
that read as follows: "[tihe undersigned Contractor does further hereby consent
and yield to the jurisdiction of the State Civil Courts of the Parish of Orleans
and does hereby formally waive any pleas of jurisdiction on account of the residence elsewhere of the undersigned Contractor."l 30 The court reasoned that "[a]
party's consent to jurisdiction in one forum does not necessarily waive its right
to have an action heard in another." 3 1 It is worth emphasizing once again that
for a forum selection clause to be exclusive, "it must do more than establish that

122
123

Id. at 626.
Id. at 453.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 631.

126

Id.

Ocwen Orlando Holdings Corp. v. Harvard Prop. Trust, 526 F.3d 1379, 1381 (11th Cir.
2008); see also Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1262 (11th Cir. 1999).
128
Ocwen, 526 F.3d at 1381.
129
Id.
127

130

131

City of New Orleans v. Mun. Admin. Servs., Inc., 376 F.3d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id.
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one forum will have jurisdiction."l 3 2 In other words, the parties must clearly
show their intent to make one (or multiple) jurisdictions exclusive.' 3 3
In similar fashion, an earlier Fifth Circuit decision found a forum selection clause permissive that read as follows: "This agreement shall be construed
and enforceable according to the law of the State of New York and the parties
submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of New York." 34 Here, the court found
that the clause's language yielded "two opposing, yet reasonable, interpretations," but reasoned that the conventional contract doctrine commanded that in
such a case, the clause is interpreted against its drafter.' 35 Other courts have
likewise struggled to interpret seemingly contradictory and otherwise ambiguous forum selection clauses as either mandatory or permissive.136
The most typical clause language indicating a permissive rather than
mandatory clause is language which holds that party submits or consents to the
jurisdiction of a certain court or courts, but which also lacks language of exclusivity.13' For example, a Georgia appellate court held that a clause in a student
loan promissory note was permissive because the borrower stated that he "consent/ed] to the jurisdiction of Massachusetts courts and to the placement of venue in Boston." 3 8 The court reasoned that the clause "simply permits suit to be
brought in a place where jurisdiction and venue might not otherwise be proper,
but it does not dictate the forum." 3 9 In a similar vein, a forum selection clause
132

Id.

Id.
134
Keaty v. Freeport Indonesia, Inc., 503 F.2d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1974).
135 Id. at 957. Mississippi courts have found Fifth Circuit law persuasive. See, e.g., Long
Beach Auto Auction, Inc. v. United Sec. Alliance, Inc., 936 So. 2d 351, 355-56 (Miss. 2006)
(holding as mandatory a clause that stated that any dispute between the parties "shall be the subject matter jurisdiction" of Florida courts, and that venue "shall be proper solely in Hillsborough
County"); Titan Indem. Co. v. Hood, 895 So. 2d 138, 146 (Miss. 2004) (holding as mandatory a
clause stating that the parties consented to the "exclusive" jurisdiction and venue in Bexar County,
Texas); Fair v. Lighthouse Carwash Sys., LLC, 961 So. 2d 60, 65 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
as permissive a clause that failed to "include clear, unequivocal language expressly prohibiting
litigation in forums other than the one(s) designated in the clause").
136 See, e.g., W. Ref. Yorktown, Inc. v. BP Corp. N. Am., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518-23
(E.D. Va. 2009) (applying Illinois law) (holding that under Illinois law, a forum selection clause
that included both the mandatory language "shall be filed in," and the permissive language "may
be properly venued in" and "on a non-exclusive basis," was permissive); Weisser v. PNC Bank,
N.A., 967 So. 2d 327, 331-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a mandatory clause in loan
application and in later agreement between borrower and lender selected different states as the
exclusive forum for litigation did not create ambiguity rendering forum selection clauses permissive because later agreement provided that nothing in it could modify the loan application; therefore, second conflicting clause was unenforceable and first clause held mandatory).
13 See generally Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of ContractualProvision Limiting
Place or Court in Which Action May be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404 (1984).
13 Murray v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., 612 S.E.2d 23, 24 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added).
13 Id. (quoting Carbo v. Colonial Pac. Leasing Corp., 592 S.E.2d 445, 447 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003)).
133
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may also permit action in either federal or state court if the parties submit to the

jurisdiction of either.14 0
As the cases illustrated above indicate, there are no special "magic
words"1 4 1 which make a forum selection clause mandatory or permissive in its
effect. The particular language employed in such clauses may vary, but to find
a clause mandatory, courts require a clear intent to make the designated forum
exclusive as to all others. Words such as "shall," "must" "only," or "sole," are
the most common words of limitation utilized to ensure a mandatory effect. Of
course, practitioners must also note that courts apply the well-known canons of
contract construction when interpreting forum selection clauses.14 2
3.

Are the Claims and Parties Involved in the Suit Governed by
the Forum Selection Clause?

The Caperton court addressed this two-part inquiry separately: first, the
Court asked whether the claims asserted in present litigation are subject to the
forum selection clause. 14 3
Syllabus point seven holds that "[t]o determine whether certain claims
fall within the scope of a mandatory forum[]selection clause, the deciding court
must base its determination on the language of the clause and the nature of the
claims that are allegedly subject to the clause."1 4 4 Moreover, "[w]hen ascertaining the applicability of a contractual provision to particular claims, [the court]
examine[s] the substance of those claims, shorn of their labels." 45
Applied in Caperton, the Court construed the clause language pursuant
to Virginia law, as required by the choice of law provision. 14 6 The pertinent
language stated that the clause applied to "[a]ll actions brought in connection

See J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Reijtenbagh, 611 F. Supp. 2d 389, 391 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
141
Remedio, 877 So. 2d at 829.
142
For a helpful guide in drafting effective forum selection clauses in commercial agreements,
including the problems of mandatory versus permissive language, see Planningfor Forum Selection in Commercial Transactions,a publication of the New York State Bar Journal. John G. Powers, Planningfor Forum Selection in Commercial Transactions, 78 N.Y. ST. B.J. 2, 22 (Feb.
2006).
143
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 340 (W. Va. 2009). However, before
addressing the substantive issue, the Court noted that it was limited to the claims and parties as
were asserted as part of the complaint below because the present review was based on the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at n.29. See also Powderidge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Highland
Props., Ltd., 474 S.E.2d 872, 880 (W. Va. 1996) ("To be clear, our review is limited to the record
as it stood before the circuit court at the time of its ruling.").
1" Syl. pt. 7, Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 327 (citing Deep Water Slender Wells, Ltd. v. Shell Int'l
Exploration & Prod., Inc., 234 S.W.3d 679, 687-88 (Tex. App. 2007)).
145
Id. at 340 (quoting Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 388 (2d Cir. 2007)).
146
Id.
140
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with this Agreement."l 47 First, the Court conducted a plain language analysis
and found that the phrase "all actions" evinced no intent to restrict the type of
actions to which the clause applies.1 4 8 Therefore, as the Court noted, the clause
would "apply equally to contract claims, tort claims, and statutory claims so
long as such claims are 'brought in connection with' the 1997 CSA."l 49
Next, the Court determined that the phrase "in connection with" should
be construed broadly under Virginia law, which commands that words and
phrases be given their "usual, ordinary, and popular meaning." 5 0 In referencing
three popular dictionary definitions of the word "connection,"15 the Court held
that "so long as the claims asserted in [the] action bear a logical relationship to
the 1997 CSA, they fall within its scope, regardless of whether they sound in
contract, tort, or some other area of the law."' 5 2
In support of this broad construction, the Court again referenced the
Phillips decision, 5 3 the case from which the Caperton court adopted its enforceability rubric. The Phillips court held that the phrase "in connection with"
was broader than the language "arise out of,"54 while an earlier Second Circuit
decision actually found "no substantive difference .

.

. between the phrases 're-

lating to,' 'in connection with,' or 'arising from."' The Phillips court ultimately
rejected an argument that only contractual violations fell within the scope of the
forum selection clause. 55 The Caperton court found the reasoning of a Third
Circuit case, among other federal and state decisions, similarly persuasive.15 6
Id. at 341
Id.
149
Id.
ISO Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting Heron v. Transp. Cas. Ins. Co., 650 S.E.2d 699, 702
(Va. 2007)).
151
Id. The court cited definitions from THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY II, 838-39 (1970 re147

148

issue); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 431-32 (2d ed. 1998); and
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 481 (1993).

152

Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 341.
Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007).
154
Caperton,690 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting Phillips, 494 F.3d at 389).
155
Id. (quoting Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1361 (2d Cir. 1993)).
156
Id. at 342 ("The ordinary meaning of the phrase 'arising in relation to' is simple. To say
that a dispute 'arise[s] . . . in relation to' the 1990 Agreement is to say that the origin of the dispute is related to that agreement, i.e., that the origin of the dispute has some 'logical or causal
connection' to the 1990 Agreement." (quoting John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int'l Corp., 119
F.3d 1070, 1074 (3d Cir. 1997))). The Caperton court also cites Klotz v. Xerox Corp., 519 F.
Supp. 2d 430, 434 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Plaintiffs state law tort and contract claims are also part
of an 'action in connection with the Plan' and are covered by the clause."); Doe v. Seacamp Ass'n
Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 222, 227 (D. Mass. 2003) ("A review of the case law leads me to conclude
that the tort claims, too, are covered by the forum selection clause. The forum selection clause
was worded to indicate that it governed any claim related to or arising from a contract, the subject
of which were the terms and conditions of John Doe's enrollment at Seacamp."); and Dexter Axle
Co. v. Baan U.S.A., Inc., 833 N.E.2d 43, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that claims sounding in
tort and under statute were subject to the forum selection clause).
153
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In determining whether the allegations in Caperton came within the
purview of the forum selection clause, the Court considered three of the claims,
all of which sound in tort:157 [1] tortious interference, [2] fraudulent misrepresentation, and [3] fraudulent concealment. 5 8 The Court found that the injuries
alleged in connection with the three tort claims "flow directly from [the] declaration of force majeure, an event that is inextricably connected to the 1997
Indeed, the Court makes clear that without the declaration of force
CSA."'
majeure (as provided for within the 1997 CSA) none of the three tort claims
would be cognizable. Thus, "these claims are all 'brought in connection with'
the 1997 CSA and, as a consequence, are within the scope of the forum[]selection clause contained therein." 60 The Court, however, took note of
adverse authority in some jurisdictions which holds that "a forum selection
clause is applicable to tort claims only where the resolution of the claim requires
interpretation of the contract."' 6 '
The next inquiry is whether the parties involved in the suit are subject
to the forum selection clause.' 62 Syllabus point eight instructs:
A range of transaction participants, signatories and nonsignatories, may benefit from and be subject to a forum selection clause. In order for a non-signatory to benefit from or be
subject to a forum selection clause, the non-signatory must be
closely related to the dispute such that it becomes foreseeable
that the non-signatory may benefit from or be subject to the forum selection clause. 63
In Caperton, the Harman Companies and Mr. Caperton claimed that as
"strangers to the 1997 CSA," the defendants were "precluded from enforcing its
157
The Court notes here that "only three of the claims asserted in the amended complaint were
ultimately presented to the jury for a verdict, indicating that there was insufficient evidence to
support the remaining claims." Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 342. The Court thus restricted its review
to only those which "ultimately went to the jury." Id.
158

Id.

159

Id.

Id.
Id. at 343 n.31 ("Whether a forum selection clause applies to tort claims depends on whether
resolution of the claims relates to interpretation of the contract." (citing Manetti Farrow, Inc. v.
Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1988))); see also Clinton v. Janger, 583 F. Supp.
284, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1984). The Caperton court declined to adopt this proposition in light of the
broadly constructed forum selection clause found in the case, but noted that even if it did adopt
such a position, "insofar as the claims asserted in this action all flow from the allegedly wrongful
declaration offorce majeure, they would require interpretation of the contract to determine whether the declaration was indeed wrongful." Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 343 n.31.; Berrett v. Life Ins.
Co., 623 F. Supp. 946, 948-49 (D. Utah 1985).
162
Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 343.
163
Syl. pt. 8, Caperton,690 S.E.2d at 327.
160

161
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terms as they [were] not third-party beneficiaries of the contract."'6 They also
claimed that two of the plaintiffs, Harman Development and Mr. Caperton, were
not signatories to the same agreement and thus "may not be bound by its
terms."6' The Court disagreed. 16 6
The Court advanced two federal circuit court decisions as persuasive authority.16 7 First, in Manetti-Farrow,Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc.,'6 8 "the Ninth
Circuit found that a forum[]selection clause was applicable to 'a range of transaction participants' who were 'closely related to the contractual relationship
. . . .'169 Second, in Hugel v. Corporationof Lloyd's,170 the Seventh Circuit
held that "[i]n order to bind a non-party to a forum selection clause, the party
must be 'closely related' to the dispute such that it becomes 'foreseeable' that it
will be bound."' 7 ' The Caperton court also adopted an additional finding from
Hugel, which held that "a non-party to a contract need not be a third-party beneficiary in order for the forum[]selection clause to be binding against such nonparty." 72
In Caperton, plaintiffs Sovereign, Mr. Caperton (as president of Sovereign), and Harman Mining were all signatories to the 1997 CSA, though plaintiffs Harman Development and Mr. Caperton (in his individual capacity), did
not sign the agreement.17 3 Even so, the Court noted that Sovereign and Harman
Mining were, at the time of the decision, wholly-owned subsidiaries of Harman
Development.17 4 Moreover, Mr. Caperton was, at that time, the sole owner of
Harman Development.'7 1 "Under these facts," the Court concluded, "Mr. Caperton and Harman Development were closely connected to the 1997 CSA such
that it was foreseeable that they would be subject to the forum[]selection clause
165

Id. at 343.

166

Id.
Id.

167

858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988).
169
Caperton,690 S.E.2d at 343 (quoting Manetti-Farrow,858 F.2d at 514 n.5). Further quoting Mannetti-Farrow,the Caperton Court notes that "a range of transaction participants, parties,
and non-parties, should benefit from and be subject to forum selection clauses." Id.
170
999 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1993).
171
Caperton,690 S.E.2d at 344 (quoting Hugel, 999 F.2d at 209).
172
Id. The Court quotes Hugel:
168

Plaintiffs argue that the court must make a threshold finding that a non-party
to a contract is a third-party beneficiary before binding him to a forum selection clause. While it may be true that third-party beneficiaries of a contract
would, by definition, satisfy the "closely related" and "foreseeability" requirements, a third-partybeneficiary status is not required.
Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 344.
173
Id. at 348.
174
Id.
17

Id.
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contained therein."l 76 Therefore, the Court held that even though Harman Development and Mr. Caperton individually were not signatories to the 1997 CSA,
both were necessarily bound by it.' 77
While none of the Massey defendants were signatories to the 1997
CSA, Massey Coal later became the parent of signatory Wellmore.178 Furthermore, Wellmore was a subsidiary of Massey at the time it declared force majeure. On these bases, the Court held that the Massey defendants were "closely
connected to the 1997 CSA such that it was foreseeable that they should benefit
from the enforcement of the forum[]selection clause contained therein."1 79 As
this particular conclusion was fervently disputed by the lone dissenting justice, 80 the Court cited or quoted approximately thirty-one federal and state cases
in its survey of supporting authority.' 8 '
4.

Rebutting the Presumption of Enforceability

Stating that "[m]andatory choice of forum clauses will be enforced unless they are 'unreasonable,"" 82 the Caperton court adopted a four-part reasonableness test from the Fourth Circuit:
"Choice of forum and law provisions may be found unreasonable if (1) their formation was induced by fraud or overreaching;
(2) the complaining party will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court because of the grave inconvenience or
unfairness of the selected forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness
of the chosen law may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4)
their enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of
the forum state."183
In applying this test, the court must remember that "[a] party trying to
defeat a mandatory choice of forum clause bears a 'heavy burden.'" 8 4 Because
the plaintiffs in Caperton did not advance any argument challenging the forum
176

177

Id.
Id.

Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 348.
Id.
180
Justice Margaret Workman issued a strident dissent. See id. (Workman, J., dissenting).
181
See id. at 343-47.
182
Id. at 348 (quoting Belfiore v. Summit Fed. Credit Union, 452 F. Supp. 2d 629, 631 (D. Md.
2006)) (footnotes omitted).
"8
Id. (quoting Beljiore, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 631-32).
184
Id. (quoting Belfiore, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 631 n.1). As an example, the court quotes Sarmiento v. B.M.G. Entm't, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2003), which found that "if the
resisting party fails to come forward with anything beyond general and conclusory allegations of
fraud and inconvenience, the court must uphold the agreement." Id. at 348-49.
178

179
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selection clause as unreasonable or unjust at the time of the defendants' motion
to dismiss,185 the Court ultimately held that "the forum[]selection clause should
have been enforced by the circuit court, and that court's failure to grant the
Massey Defendants' motion to dismiss based upon the forum[]selection clause
was an abuse of discretion."186 Even though the Caperton court did not address
any argument attempting to rebut the presumptive enforceability of the forum
selection clause at issue in the case, the various avenues of attack in this area of
forum selection clause jurisprudence are legion. Using the Fourth Circuit's
four-part test as adopted by the Caperton court as the basis for discussion, the
remainder of this section will address the possible lines of attack on a forum
selection clause.
a.

Invalid Due to Fraud or Overreaching

As a provision whose validity is always subject to the existence of any
number of contractual infirmities, a forum selection clause may be set aside if it
is affected by fraud or overreaching. 18' First, under West Virginia law,
[t]he essential elements in an action for fraud are: (1) that the
act claimed to be fraudulent was the act of the defendant or induced by him; (2) that it was material and false; [(3)]that plaintiff relied on it and was justified under the circumstances in relying upon it; and [(4)] that he was damaged because he relied
on it.
However, the critical question in such cases, is whether the specific forum selection clause was affected by fraud. The majority position, in both state
and federal courts, is that a party resisting enforcement based upon an allegation
of fraud must allege that the specific forum selection clause was procured by

1
186

See Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 349 n.37.
Id. at 349. And ultimately, the Court observed:

We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that the motivating factor for
the Harman Companies and Mr. Caperton to bring the tort claims in West
Virginia may have been due to the fact that Virginia has a cap on punitive
damages and West Virginia does not. See VA. CODE § 8.01-38.1 (1987) ("In
no event shall the total amount awarded for punitive damages exceed
$350,000.00."). Virginia also does not allow punitive damages for contract
claims.
Id. at 349 n.38.
187
See Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972).
188
Syl. pt. 3, Cordial v. Ernst & Young, 483 S.E.2d 248, 250 (W. Va. 1996).
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fraud-as opposed to the contract as a whole.189 As the Supreme Court noted in
an early post-Bremen decision, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the federal law
fraud exception for forum selection clause enforceability
does not mean that any time a dispute arising out of a transaction is based upon an allegation of fraud . . . the clause is unen-

forceable. Rather, it means that an arbitration or forum[]selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if the inclusion of that clause in the contract was the product offraud
or coercion.190
The rationale behind this position is to prevent resisting parties from escaping forum selection enforcement through artful pleading. A federal district
court in Colorado explained the underlying policy justification:
If a forum clause were to be rejected whenever a plaintiff asserted a generic claim of fraud in the inducement .. .then forum
clauses would be rendered essentially meaningless. That is,
whenever a plaintiff had a breach of contract claim, it could defeat an otherwise clear, detailed, and comprehensive forum selection clause by simply alleging fraud as well. Such a holding
would denigrate the Supreme Court's overriding mantra expressed in [Bremen] and Stewart that forum selection clauses
should not be dismissed lightly. 191

See, e.g., Bohl v. Hauke, 906 N.E.2d 450, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) ("To invalidate a forum[]selection clause, alleged wrongdoing 'must relate directly to the negotiation or acceptance of
the forum selection clause itself, and not just to the contract generally."'); Ex parte Leasecomm
Corp., 879 So. 2d 1156, 1159 (Ala. 2003) ("[T]he proper inquiry is whether the forum[]selection
clause is the result of fraud in the inducement in the negotiation or inclusion in the agreement of
the forum[]selection clause itself. If the forum[]selection clause is the result of fraud in the inducement, then the fraud exception to the enforceability of the clause applies. However, if the
claim of fraud in the inducement is directed toward the entire contract, the fraud exception to
enforcement of the forum[]selection clause does not apply."); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 1998) ("By requiring the plaintiff specifically to allege
that the choice clause itself was included in the contract due to fraud in order to succeed in a claim
that the choice is unenforceable, courts may ensure that more general claims of fraud will be litigated in the chosen forum, in accordance with the contractual expectations of the parties.") (emphasis in original).
190
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974) (emphasis added); see also
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967) (arbitration clause was
enforceable despite allegation of fraud in the inducement of the contract because there was no
claim that the arbitration clause itself was induced by fraud). See, e.g., Stephens v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 636, 641 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ("Plaintiffs' allegations of fraud in the
inducement of the agreement concern misrepresentations of projected sales and profits and have
no connection to the inclusion of the clause.").
191
REO Sales, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 925 F. Supp. 1491, 1495 (D. Colo. 1996).
189
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Many courts have adopted this position. For example, in one Texas appellate decision, a franchisee brought an action for breach of contract and fraud
in the inducement against the franchisor.19 2 The trial court enforced the forum
selection clause located within the breached franchise agreement which purported to name San Francisco, California, as the exclusive forum.193 The plaintiff-franchisee attempted to escape the operation of the forum selection clause
by pleading fraud in the inducement of the entire agreement.' 94 Based on the
authority discussed above, the Texas court held that "simply alleging fraud in
the inducement of a contract is not sufficient to make a forum selection clause

unenforceable."

95

Relying on Scherk, the Fifth Circuit in Haynsworth v. The Corpora-

tion196 likewise refused to invalidate a forum selection clause based on allegations of fraud or overreaching aimed at aspects of the agreement other than the
forum selection clause, as those "allegations are irrelevant to [forum selection]

enforceability."l 9 7
The Sixth Circuit has similarly held that "there must be a well-founded
claim of fraud in the inducement of the clause itself, standing apartfrom the
whole agreement to render a [forum selection] clause unenforceable." 9 8 Indeed, "[w]hen pled generally, claims of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation do
not relate to a forum selection clause." 9 9
192

My Caf&-CCC, Ltd. v. Lunchstop, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 860, 860 (Tex. App. 2003).

193

Id. at 862-63.
Id. at 864.

194

195
Id. at 867. See also A.I. Credit Corp. v. Liebman, 791 F. Supp. 427, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(by failing to show that the forum selection clause was itself made a part of the contract by means
of fraud, defendant failed to rebut presumption of enforceability as unreasonable under the circumstances).
196
Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997). The Eighth Circuit has also
adopted this position. See Marano Enter. of Kansas v. Z-Teca Rest., L.P. 254 F.3d 753, 757 (8th
Cir. 2001) ("[The] complaint does not even remotely suggest that the clauses were inserted into
the agreements as the result of fraud, and the brief on appeal offers no specifics concerning what
the fraud might have been or how it was perpetrated. The general allegation by [plaintiffl that it
was induced by fraud to enter into the franchise and development agreements is insufficient to
raise an issue that the forum[]selection clauses within those agreements may be unenforceable
because of fraud, and so [plaintiff's] argument must fail.").
1
Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 963. See also Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298,
301 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that "[a]llegations that the entire contract was procured as the result
of fraud . . . are 'inapposite to our [forum selection clause] enforceability determination"').
19 Moses v. Bus. Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1138 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Arnold v.
Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1278 (6th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis in original). See generally Garten
v. Kurth, 265 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2001); Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 160 (7th Cir.
1993); Am. Fin. Serv. Grp. v. Technimar Indus., Inc., No. 97 CIV. 9067, 1998 WL 684589
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998).
1
Moses, 929 F.2d at 1138. But cf Great Earth Cos., Inc. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 890 (6th
Cir. 2002) (granting a motion to compel arbitration in Michigan by holding misrepresentation
went only to the arbitration location and not to the actual agreement to arbitrate).
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Despite the majority rule, a few state cases have held forum selection
clauses unenforceable where the entire agreement was affected by fraud. 2 00 For
instance, New York state courts have found that where "the record is replete
with allegations indicating that the entire Agreement was permeated with
fraud," the forum selection clause contained therein is unenforceable.2 01
Like allegations of fraud, well-aimed claims of overreaching may also
vitiate a forum selection clause. The Haynsworth court defined overreaching as
"that which results from an inequality of bargaining power or other circumstances in which there is an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of
the parties." 2 02 Beyond a disparity in bargaining power, a lack of negotiation or
unfair surprise may also support a claim of overreaching. 203 So-called "boilerplate" forum selection clauses in contracts of adhesion 2 04 are frequent targets of
attack. 2 05 Because forum selection clause litigation frequently involves commercial parties-commonly referred to as sophisticated individuals and businesses-claims of overreaching or a lack of bargaining between such entities
often fail.206 Of course, the party resisting enforcement must not forget the wellSee, e.g., Johnson v. Key Equip. Fin., 627 S.E.2d 740, 741-42 (S.C. 2006) ("Generally,
when wrongs arise inducing a party to execute a contract and not directly from the breach of that
contract, the remedies and limitations specified by the contract do not apply.").
201
Studebaker-Worthington Leasing Corp. v. New Concepts Realty, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 752,
756 (N.Y. App. Term 2009) (quoting DeSola Group v. Coors Brewing Co., 605 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993)).
200

202

Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 965 n.17 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (6th ed. 1990)).

Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edition, defines overreaching as "[tlhe act or an instance of taking
unfair commercial advantage of another, especially by fraudulent means."
203
See 71 Am. JUR. 2d Specific Performance § 63; see, e.g, Chudner v. TransUnion Interactive,
Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1089 (D. Or. 2009).
204
"'Adhesion contracts' include all 'form contracts' submitted by one party on the basis of
this or nothing. Since the bulk of contracts signed in this country, if not every major Western
nation, are adhesion contracts, a rule automatically invalidating adhesion contracts would be completely unworkable. Instead courts engage in a process of judicial review. Finding that there is an
adhesion contract is the beginning point for analysis, not the end of it; what courts aim at doing is
distinguishing good adhesion contracts which should be enforced from bad adhesion contracts
which should not." Clites v. Clawges, 685 S.E.2d 693, 700 (W. Va. 2009) (quoting Dunlap v.
Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 273 (W. Va. 2002)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187 cmt. b (Rev. 1988).
205
See, e.g., Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2009);
Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 389 (1st Cir. 2001); Fireman's Fund Insur.
Co. v. M.V. DSR Atl., 131 F.3d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1997); Medicap Pharmacies, Inc. v. Faidley,
416 F. Supp. 2d 678, 684-85 (S.D. Iowa 2006); Bohl v. Hauke, 906 N.E.2d 450, 455-56 (Ohio
App. 2009).
206
For example, in Republic Mortg. Ins. Co. v. Brightware, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 482, 484
(M.D.N.C. 1999), the court wrote:
[The plaintiff] emphasizes that "no negotiations," "no bargaining," and "no
discussions" took place over either the forum[]selection clause .... However,
[plaintiff] cannot now avoid a provision of a freely-entered contract because it
did not consider the provision carefully at the time the Agreements were negotiated. Despite [plaintiffs] implication to the contrary, the Agreements were
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known legal maxim that a party who signs a written document is assumed to
have knowledge of its contents.207
The best example of an overreaching-type attack on a forum selection
clause is found in Shute.20 8 As noted in Section II.B above, the United States
Supreme Court held as valid a forum selection clause located on a form passage
contract-in this case, the cruise line ticket. The passenger resisted enforcement
based primarily on the argument that the clause in question was not the result of
negotiation. 209 The high court flatly rejected this position.210 Basing its reasoning on the particular business context,211 the Shute Court found that
it would be entirely unreasonable for us to assume that respondents-or any other cruise passenger-would negotiate with petitioner the terms of a forum[]selection clause in an ordinary
commercial cruise ticket. Common sense dictates that a ticket
far from an adhesion contract in which these provisions were forced upon an
unsuspecting consumer. Rather, these Agreements were negotiated between
two sophisticated business entities.
See e.g., Hartash Constr., Inc. v. Drury Inns, Inc., No. 00-31120, 2001 WL 361109, *3 (5th Cir.
2001) ("[T]his case concerns two sophisticated parties negotiating a $1.26 million contract at arms
length . . . . [Plaintiffs] conclusory assertion that the contract as a whole is one sided does not
satisfy its burden."); Int'l Software Sys., Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 116 (5th Cir. 1996)
(notwithstanding the smaller relative size of the plaintiffs business, the court found that the plaintiff was "a fairly sophisticated business with experience in negotiating complex government and
private contracts" and that the plaintiffs "David versus Goliath argument [was] not persuasive");
Karl Koch Erecting Co., Inc. v. N.Y. Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 659 (2d Cir.
1988) (the absence of negotiation over the terms of a contract does to render a forum selection
clause unenforceable); Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1197 (4th Cir.
1985) ("There is nothing in the record to suggest that Bryant is an unsophisticated entity lacking
sufficient commercial expertise to be able to decide whether to enter into a given contract.");
MaxEn Capital, LLC v. Sutherland, Civ. Action No. H-08-3590, 2009 WL 936895 at *8 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 3, 2009) (holding that the parties were "sophisticated individuals and businesses" and
that "[t]here is no allegation of any inability to negotiate freely");
207
See Sedlock v. Moyle, 668 S.E.2d 176, 180 (W. Va. 2008) ("[I]n the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the failure to read a contract before signing it does not excuse a person from
being bound by its terms." (quoting Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 910
(W. Va. 1982))); see also Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corp., 696
F.2d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 1982); Pepe v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 750 A.2d 1167, 1169 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2000) ("The general rule is that where a person of mature years and who can read and write,
signs or accepts a formal written contract affecting his pecuniary interests, it is his duty to read it
and notice of its contents will be imputed to him if he negligently fails to do so . . . ." (quoting
Ursini v. Goldman, 173 A.789 (Conn. 1934))); R.D. Johnson Milling Co. v. Read, 85 S.E. 726,
730 (W. Va. 1915).
208
See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
209
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991). The Respondents second
argument was that enforcement of the clause would effectively deprive them of their day in court.
Id.
210

id.

211

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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of this kind will be a form contract the terms of which are not
subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the
ticket will not have bargaining parity with the cruise line.212
The Court determined that the enormous disparity of bargaining power
which existed between the passenger and Carnival Cruise Lines was not so unreasonable to void the forum selection clause because the cruise line company
had a strong interest in limiting the fora in which it would be amenable to suit.
Indeed, "a cruise ship typically carries passengers from many locales[;] it is not
unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the cruise line to litigation in
several different fora." 2 13
In what amounts to a refocus on the economic policy justifications for
forum selection clauses, 2 14 the Court noted that the predictability and associated
cost-savings of litigating in a single, exclusive forum should ultimately help
maintain lower ticket prices for passengers.215 More than any other, the Shute
decision emphasizes the point that even an enormous disparity in bargaining
power coupled with a total lack of negotiation will not necessarily void a forum
selection clause found within a contract of adhesion.216 However, the Court
noted that in cases of form passage contracts, the clause at issue would be subject to a fundamental fairness analysis.2 17
West Virginia law recognizes adhesion contracts as a modern commercial reality; thus, they are not prima facie invalid. 21 8 Even so, a court should
conduct a fundamental fairness analysis 219 that inquires whether the provision is
"unconscionable or was thrust upon [the resisting party] because [it] was unwary and taken advantage of."2 20 Indeed, a recent federal district court decision
212
213

Shute, 499 U.S. at 593.
Id.

See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
Shute, 499 U.S. at 594.
216
See, e.g., Mercury West A.G., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 03 Civ. 5262(JFK),
2004 WL 421793 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004) ("A forum selection clause included in a nonnegotiated form contract has the power to bind parties.").
217
Id. at 595. In determining the fundamental fairness of such a clause, the court should consider whether the plaintiffs had notice of the clause; whether the defendant chose its corporate
location to avoid litigation; whether the clause names a "remote alien forum;" and whether the
defendant acted in bad faith in obtaining plaintiff's consent to the offending clause. Id. at 594-95;
see also Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1995); Carron v. Holland Am.
Line-Westours Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 322, 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
218
See Clites v. Clawges, 685 S.E.2d 693, 700-l(W. Va. 2009).
219
This is not unlike what the United States Supreme Court in Shute held when it determined
that provisions within form passage contracts, while prima facie valid, are "subject to judicial
scrutiny for fundamental fairness." See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
220
Clites, 685 S.E.2d at 700 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley Cnty. v. W. Harley Miller, Inc.,
236 S.E.2d 439, 441 (W. Va. 1977)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3)
(1981).
214
215
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applying West Virginia law reached a similar conclusion when it rejected a paving company's claim that a forum selection clause was invalid because the contract was a one of adhesion.22 1
Inequality of bargaining alone does not make a contractual provision
unconscionable; rather, "gross inadequacy in bargaining power, together with
terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indications that
the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion or may show that
the weaker party had no meaningful, no real alternative, . . . to the unfair

terms." 2 22 Thus, a determination of unconscionability "must focus on the relative positions of the parties, the adequacy of the bargaining position, the meaningful alternatives available to the plaintiff, and the 'existence of unfair terms
in the contract. ,,223
In a recent West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decision that addressed and rejected an unconscionability attack on an arbitration agreement, 224
the court noted in dicta that "[a] forum selection clause in an employment contract, contained in a contract of adhesion, which requires an employee to arbitrate or litigate his or her employment claims infar-awayjurisdictions,remotely
removed from the employee's actual place of employment or residence, would
be troubling to this Court."22 5
Claims of overreaching in regards to a forum selection clause are not
always unsuccessful.22 6 In Eads v. Woodmen of the World Life InsuranceSociety,227 an Oklahoma appellate court held as unenforceable a forum selection
clause contained within a contract that plaintiff "was forced to sign in order to
negotiation at
retain his job as a field representative. Rather than voluntary
22 8
arm's length, [plaintiff] was given no 'meaningful choice."'
221

See Blacktop Indus., Inc. v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., 2009 WL 1140020 *2-4 (S.D.W. Va.
2009) (applying West Virginia law).
222
Id. at *2 (quoting Art's Flower Shop, Inc. v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 413 S.E.2d
670, 674-75 (W. Va. 1992)).
223
Id. (quoting Syl. pt. 4, Art's Flower Shop, 413 S.E.2d 671). See also Syl. pt. 4, Clites, 685
S.E.2d at 695.
224
Clites, 685 S.E.2d 693. The same court in Saylor v. Wilkes, 613 S.E.2d 914, 922-23 (W.
Va. 2005), held an arbitration agreement unenforceable as an unconscionable contract of adhesion
where the defendant's actions "demonstrate[d] a flagrant disparity in bargaining power, confirm[ed] a lack of meaningful alternatives available to [the] Petitioner and establish[ed] the omission of critical terms and conditions in the arbitration document."
225
Clites, 685 S.E.2d at 701 n.4 (emphasis added). See also Am. Gen. Life and Accident Ins.
Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 88-89 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing West Virginia law on adhesion
contracts regarding challenge to arbitration clause). Both Clites and Wood provide highly instructive discussions of unconscionability under West Virginia law.
226
See, e.g., Weidner Commc'n, Inc. v. H.R.H. Prince Bandar Al Faisal, 859 F.2d 1302 (7th
Cir. 1988) (discussion of overwhelming bargaining power based on intimidation by foreign leader).
227
Eads v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins., 785 P.2d 328 (Ok. App. 1989).
228
Id. at 331.
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Taken together, the aforementioned West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals dictum and related case law from other jurisdictions indicate that forum
selection clauses in employment contracts may be vulnerable to claims of overreaching, especially when the designated forum is a relatively long distance
from the site of employment or the employee's residence.
b.

Grave Inconvenience or Unfairness

Beyond fraud or overreaching, a forum selection clause is unreasonable
if "the complaining party will for all practical purposes be deprived of his [or
her] day in court because of the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the se-

lected forum." 2 29
However, "where it can be said with reasonable assurance that at the
time [of the making ofj the contract, the parties .

.

. contemplated the claimed

inconvenience," such inconvenience will not typically invalidate the forum selection clause. 2 30 Essentially, in analyzing an inconvenience claim, courts focus
on whether the burdens claimed by the resisting party were foreseeable at the
time the resisting party ratified the agreement.23 1 Unsurprisingly, most inconvenience claims rest on the claimed high expense of litigating in the selected forum and focus chiefly on travel costs.
If a court determines that the claimed inconvenience was not foreseeable, the likelihood of success under this line of attack depends upon whether the
expense of litigating in a distant forum would all but close the courthouse doors
to the suit. Of course, generalized allegations of financial difficulty will not
invalidate a forum selection clause,232 and the resisting party bears a "heavy
burden" to prove the unreasonableness of the presumptively valid forum selection clause.2 33
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 348 (W. Va. 2009) (quoting Belfiore v.
Summit Fed. Credit Union, 452 F. Supp. 2d 629, 631 (D. Md. 2006)); Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
230
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
231
Cf Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch Maschinen GmbH, 972 F.2d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 1992)
(explaining that the great expense of litigating in a distant forum will not invalidate a forum selection clause because plaintiff "was presumably compensated for this burden by way of the consideration it received under the contract"); see, e.g., Long v. Dart Int'l, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 774, 778
(W.D. Tenn. 2001) (rejecting an inconvenience challenge to a forum selection clause on foreseeability grounds even though the plaintiff would need to travel 1046 miles).
232
See, e.g., Mercury W. A.G. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 03 Civ. 5262(JFK), 2004
WL 421793, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Simply claiming financial distress does not warrant setting
aside a valid forum selection clause."); Price v. Leasecomm Corp., No. 1:03CV685, 2004 WL
727028, at *5 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (stating that despite plaintiffs unemployment and financial difficulties, forum selection clause naming Massachusetts as exclusive forum is enforceable); Envirolite Enter., Inc. v. Glastechnishe Industrie Peter Lisec Gesechaft M.B.H., 53 B.R. 1007, 1012-13
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejecting a challenge to forum selection clause reasonableness based on plaintiff's bankruptcy).
233
Shute, 499 U.S. at 592.
229
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Beyond expense, a resisting party may also claim that the selected forum is inconvenient because the party's witnesses or physical evidence are located too great a distance from the selected forum; however, some courts have
said that location and convenience of witnesses are generally not considered a
serious or grave inconvenience.2 34 In such cases, courts point to the fact that
deposition testimony can be utilized by those parties whose witnesses cannot
travel to the chosen forum.23 5 Quoting a Second Circuit decision, the Fifth Circuit recently noted that "with modem conveniences of electronic filing and vimay have his [or her] day in court without ever
deoconferencing, '[a] plaintiff
2 36
setting foot in a courtroom."'
Even if a resisting party's witnesses are located a great distance from
the designated forum, the inconvenience will not typically support invalidation
of the forum selection clause where the court determines that the inconvenience
was foreseeable at the time the agreement was ratified.2 37 In a separate vein, at
least one court has recognized that "[tlhe enforcement of a forum[]selection
clause creates a serious inconvenience if it would result in two lawsuits involving similar claims or issues being tried in separate courts." 2 38
Only cases with extreme facts seem to necessitate the invalidation of forum selection clauses on grounds of grave inconvenience. For instance, a federal district court in Texas found an otherwise valid forum selection clause in a
wrongful termination case unreasonable where the resisting plaintiff alleged
sufficient "personal and economic hardship" such that enforcing the clause
See, e.g., Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp, 696 F.2d 315,
317-18 (stating that the inconvenience of witnesses having to travel from West Virginia to New
York was not sufficiently grave to void forum selection clause); Alpha Sys. Integration, Inc. v.
Silicon Graphics, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); In re Kyocera Wireless
Corp., 162 S.W.3d 758, 767 (Tex. App. 2005) (stating that "[e]ssentially bare allegations of inconvenience are insufficient to satisfy its burden").
235
See, e.g., Interfund Corp. v. O'Byrne, 462 N.W.2d 86, 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (citing
Hauen Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 1982)); Ira C. Wolpert, Overcoming Presumptive Validity of a Forum-Selection Clause, 37 MD. B.J. 55, 57 (2004)
(stating that in order to overcome this presumption, a resisting party should provide an "explanation why their testimony could not be provided by deposition or video deposition").
236
Calix-Chacon v. Global Int'l Marine, Inc., 493 F.3d 507, 515 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1995)).
237
See, e.g., Brock v. Entre Computer Ctrs., Inc., 933 F.2d 1253, 1258 (4th Cir. 1991) ("No
matter which forum is selected, one side or the other will be burdened with bringing themselves
and their witnesses from [another state]."); Scotland Mem.'1 Hosp., Inc. v. Integrated Informatics,
Inc., No. Civ. 1:02CV00796, 2003 WL 151852, at *5 (M.D.N.C. 2003) ("Simply put, the 'great
hardship' which Plaintiff claims it would suffer due to its 'essential personnel' being absent 'for
an extended period of time' is insufficient to establish the grave inconvenience essentially depriving Plaintiff of its day in court."); Ex parte Soprema, Inc., 949 So. 2d 907, 914 (Ala. 2006) (designating as valid a forum selection clause naming Ohio as the exclusive forum, even though most
witnesses were located in Alabama, because "[plaintiff] was aware of the potential inconvenience
of conducting litigation in a location difference from its corporate headquarters or job site before
it executed the agreement").
238
Alpha Sys. Integration v. Silicon Graphics, Inc., 646 N.W.2d at 909.
234
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would effectively deprive him of his day in court. 239 There, the plaintiff showed
to the satisfaction of the court that his diagnosis of multiple sclerosis would
make it "difficult for him to travel [interstate], because he uses a walker. ... 240
The court also rested its decision on the plaintiffs inability to "afford to travel
to Indiana or to hire local counsel in Indiana," by relying on estimates of such
costs in comparison to plaintiffs W-2 Wage and Tax Statement. 2 4 1 In sum, a
claim that an otherwise valid forum selection clause is unreasonable due to serious or grave inconvenience must be based on particularlyextraordinaryfacts
showing that the resisting party will most assuredly be deprived of his or her
day in court.
c.

Chosen Law Would Deprive Plaintiff of a Remedy

The third factor to consider under the Allen unreasonableness test is
whether the "fundamental unfairness of the chosen law may deprive plaintiff of
a remedy." 24 2 Of course, this factor concerns the choice of law provision rather
than the forum selection clause. Once again, the resisting party has a heavy
burden in showing that the chosen law is so fundamentally unfair that it may
deprive it of a remedy. An example of such a challenge may prove instructive.
A federal district court in North Carolina recently addressed this issue in
a case where the resisting party attempted to show that the Colorado forum (and
its law) was fundamentally unfair because it would deprive the party of its right
to sue under North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act,2 4 3 and
while, at the same time, the party would lack standing to bring a similar claim
under Colorado's Consumer Protection Act. 2 " The court responded:
Colorado law does provide remedies that are similar to those
[p]laintiff seeks against [defendant] in this action, such as declaratory judgment, breach of contract remedies, remedies under
the uniform commercial code, and civil conspiracy. The remedies afforded by the laws of the chosen forum need not be identical to those in North Carolina in order for the choice of law
and choice of forum clauses to be fundamentally fair. Plaintiff's argument that its remedies are "more fulsome" under
North Carolina law misstates the standard.2 45
Dominguez v. Finish Line, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 688, 691 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
240
Id. at 690-91.
241
Id. at 691.
242
Allen v. Lloyds of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1996).
243
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 et seq. (1977).
244
Bassett Seamless Guttering, Inc. v. Gutterguard, LLC, No. Civ. 1:05CV00184, 2006 WL
156874 at *6 n.10 (M.D.N.C.); see also COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-1-101 etseq. (2004).
245
Bassett, 2006 WL 156874 at *6.
239
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The "fundamentally unfair" standard is, then, a high bar that most resisting parties are unlikely to overcome, especially when a party is resisting enforcement of a forum selection or choice of law clause that names a different
state or federal court as the exclusive forum or source of law.246 This particular
prong of the Allen reasonableness test becomes more germane where a forum
selection or choice of law clause names a foreign jurisdiction as the source of
law.24 7 Even so,
[t]he third prong ... requires a showing of more than a less favorable outcome in the foreign court. "The fact that an international transaction may be subject to laws and remedies different
or less favorable than those of the United States is not a valid
basis to deny enforcement, provided that the law of the chosen
forum is not inherently unfair." 2 48
As globalization continues apace, forum selection and choice of law
clauses are as important as ever before in the international marketplace. American courts will likely continue the trend of extending more deference to the ability of foreign courts to handle even the most complex business litigation by enforcing such clauses. 2 49 This may well mean enforcing forum selection and
choice of law clauses even where the chosen forum's law differs substantially
from domestic sources. The burden of proving fundamental unfairness, of
course, remains with the party resisting enforcement.

See, e.g., Atl. Floor Servs., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (D.S.C.
2004) ("Arkansas courts are equipped to evaluate and adjudicate a common law breach of contract
claim under the state's law . . . .").
247
Calix-Chacon v. Global Intern. Marine, Inc., 493 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2007) (requiring
remand for a district court determination of a question of remedy under Honduran law).
248
Sheldon v. Hart, No. 5:09CV51, 2010 WL 114007, at *7 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 8, 2010) (quoting Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992)).
249
See, e.g., Sheldon, 2010 WL 114007, at *7 ("[T]his court has been shown nothing to suggest
that a German court would not be fair in this case."); see generally The Hague Convention on
Private International Law, Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available
at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-conventions.pdf&cid=98; Walter W. Heiser, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: The Impact on Forum Non Conveniens, Transfer
of Venue, Removal, and Recognition of Judgments in United States Courts, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
1013, 1014 (2010) (examining the impact of the Convention on forum selection clause enforceability, inter alia, and noting that the Convention "will preempt state and federal laws in some
significant areas"); M.H. Adler & M.C. Zarychta, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements: The United States Joins the Judgment Enforcement Band, 27 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus.
1 (2007).
246
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Contravention of a Strong Public Policy of the Forum
State

Finally, an otherwise valid forum selection clause may be deemed unreasonable where enforcement of the clause contravenes a strong public policy
of the forum in which the action is commenced. 25 0 Relevant public policy considerations may be found embodied in a legislative enactment or judicial decision. Like the fundamental unfairness analysis above, an analysis under this
factor of the Allen reasonableness test depends upon not only the specific claims
and remedies sought by the resisting party, but also on the policy of the state in
which the action is brought. Thus, this is a highly fact-dependent analysis requiring in-depth research into a range of public policy considerations that may
be in play in a given case.
Often, this point of attack requires courts to focus on whether the enforcement of the clause would contravene a state or federal statute, such as a
consumer protection and insurance statute. 25 1 Some states have enacted statutes
that prohibit the enforcement of forum selection clauses in certain situations.252
For instance, federal district courts have split over the interpretation of a South
Carolina statute that purports to express a public policy position against enforcement of forum selection clauses.2 53 A recent California appellate decision 254 provides an instructive example of a state court refusing to enforce a
forum selection clause that purported to designate Virginia state courts (and thus
Virginia law) as the exclusive forum, based on what the California court found
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 690 S.E.2d 322, 322 (W. Va. 2009) (quoting Belfiore v. Summit Fed. Credit Union, 452 F. Supp. 2d 629, 631 (D. Md. 2006)); Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
251 See Ira C. Wolpert, Overcoming Presumptive Validity of a Forum-Selection Clause, 37 MD.
B.J. 55, 56-57 (2004).
252
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22B-3 (West 1995). The statute states that
any provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina that requires the
prosecution of any action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises from the
contract to be instituted or heard in another state is against public policy and is
void and unenforceable. This prohibition shall not apply to non-consumer loan
transactions or to any action or arbitration of a dispute that is commenced in
another state pursuant to a forum selection provision with the consent of all
parties to the contract at the time that the dispute arises.
250

Id.
Of course, such state provisions may be preempted by federal law. See Aspen Spa Props. v. Int'l
Design Concepts, 527 F. Supp. 2d 469 (E.D.N.C. 2007) (finding that a federal Arbitration Act
provision requiring enforcement of contractual arbitration provisions preempted North Carolina
statute). Another example is a Louisiana statute that declares that forum selection clauses in contracts between contractors and subcontractors involving a Louisiana company doing business instate violate state public policy. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2779(A) (2000); see also Hartash
Const. Inc. v. Drury Inns, Inc., 2000 WL 1140498 at *3 (E.D. La.) (finding statute inapplicable).
253 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
254
Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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were the inadequate and even "hostile" consumer protection remedies of Virginia in contrast to California.2 55
In one of the first federal court decisions applying the Caperton rubric
to a forum selection challenge, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, in Sheldon v. Hart, rejected a claim that the forum
selection clause at issue was unreasonable due to West Virginia public policy. 25 6
In that case, the plaintiff resisted enforcement of a clause that purported to name
the courts of Germany as the exclusive forum by claiming that West Virginia's
interest in trying plaintiffs case in its courts is paramount due to "'the severe
and permanent injuries caused to a West Virginia resident."' 257 The Sheldon
court swiftly rejected the plaintiffs challenge, stating that "[e]ven if this court
accepted plaintiffs contention that West Virginia's interest is greater than Germany's in the outcome of the litigation, that is not what the court looks to in
deciding the public policy prong of the unreasonableness test." 2 5 8
Despite the import of this particular part of the Allen reasonableness
test, the Supreme Court of the United States has said that when federal courts
address forum selection clause enforceability, a forum state's disfavor toward
clause enforcement is not in itself dispositive when attempting to "rebut the
strong federal policy in favor of forum selection clauses."2 59 Even so, courts
may decline to enforce a forum selection clause where doing so would in some
way conflict or contravene the public policy of the forum state in which the action was first filed.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Caperton decision illustrates that West Virginia law now unquestionably reflects the current majority position in forum selection clause jurisprudence embedded in modem American law. Now that the basic requirements for
forum selection clause enforceability have been set forth under state law, individuals and businesses that engage in commercial activity have more certainty
255

Id. at 712 ("In contrast to Virginia consumer law's ostensible hostility to class actions, the

right to seek clause action relief in consumer cases has been extolled by California courts ....
[Moreover], neither punitive damages, nor enhanced remedies . . . are recoverable under Virginia's law.").
256
Sheldon v. Hart, No. 5:09CV51, 2010 WL 114007, at *7 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 8, 2010).
257
Id.

Id. Indeed, the public policy "prong" is probably better thought of as an "exception" to
enforceability. And as several courts have observed, this exception is to be applied narrowly. See
e.g., Southwest Livestock and Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1999); Ackermann v. Levin, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986); Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 2d
468, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
258

Atl. Floor Servs. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878-79 (D.S.C. 2004) (citing Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988)). The Stewart court applied the strong
federal presumption of validity in the face of Alabama decisions which found forum selection
clause enforceability counter to state public policy. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30-31.
259
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as to the operative effect of their contractual arrangements. And like the vast
majority of states, West Virginia's adoption of the federal standard for forum
selection clause enforceability represents a significant step, albeit small, toward
providing a predictable, uniform, and reasonable set of legal standards under
which individuals and businesses may commercially flourish.
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